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Abstract 
The exact contours of international organisations‟ (IO) responsibility have not yet 
been clearly defined. While IOs – and international financial institutions (IFIs) in 
particular – have in the past avoided drawing those contours in more certain terms, 
this position is slowly changing: IFIs have been changing expectations about their 
standards of conduct, as reflected in their evolving operational policies and 
procedures (OP&P). This report provides an overview of the content, formulation, 
adoption, amendment and enforcement of OP&P at multilateral development banks 
(MDB) (a subset of IFIs). It highlights the impact of three developments that are 
strengthening the normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P, 
namely: broadening stakeholder participation in OP&P revision processes; 
„hardening‟ or legalization of OP&P through the compliance procedures of 
independent accountability mechanisms (IAM) – now widely established at MDBs; 
and the emerging enforcement potential of the IAMs. 
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Acronyms and Abbreviations 
African Development Bank     AfDB 
Asian Development Bank     ADB 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development EBRD 
 Project Complaint Mechanism   PCM  
Independent Accountability Mechanism   IAM 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  ICCPR 
Inter-American Development Bank    IDB 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IBRD 
International Development Association   IDA 
International Finance Corporation    IFC 
 Compliance Advisor / Ombudsman   CAO 
International Financial Institution    IFI 
International Organisation      IO 
Multilateral Development Bank    MDB 
Operational Policies and Procedures    OP&P 
Project Affected People     PAP 
World Bank       WB 
 Business Procedure     BP 
Independent Evaluation Group    IEG 
Quality Assurance Group    QAG 
Operational Policy     OP 
Department of Institutional Integrity    INT 
World Bank Inspection Panel     WBIP 
 Eligibility Report     IR 
Investigation Report (Executive Summary)  IR (ES) 
Management Response (to ER)   MR 
Management Response to Investigation Report MR to IR 
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1. Introduction 
A key issue in the debate surrounding the responsibility of international organisations 
(IO) concerns the contours of these institutions‟ international legal obligations – or, 
what are IOs responsible for; to whom; and how might such obligations be enforced?
1
 
A conventional response to these questions is that, while IOs do have international 
legal obligations, including obligations towards individuals,
2
 the sources and content 
of those obligations remain opaque. In addition, the mechanisms for enforcing these 
obligations, insofar as they exist at all, remain weak (Horta 2002).
3
 This argument is 
typically substantiated by the fact that IOs are not usually signatories to international 
conventions, and particularly not those regulating environmental and human rights 
obligations (Clark 2002; Darrow 2006).
4
  
 However, as we argue in this report, this position is slowly changing. This 
phenomenon can be seen most clearly and dramatically in the case of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) (Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010), which will be the 
primary focus of this report. Motivated by various external factors (such as pressure 
by international civil society and local governments, media scrutiny, and changing 
views of corporate responsibility for the adverse effects of actions), IFIs have been 
raising their own expectations about their standards of conduct (Danaher (ed. 1994); 
Shihata 2000; Alfredsson & Ring (eds.) 2001; Clark et al. 2003; Head (2004); and 
Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010).  
                                                 
1
 See Scott 2000, at 38, raising the notion that the accountability issue has to be analysed from various 
perspectives; this approach also reflected in the ILA‟s 2004 report on the Accountability of 
International Organisations.  
2
 See e.g., 2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, MR, at para. 16 (the Bank repeating 
the (then) standard WB position that the Bank‟s mandate only covered socio-economic rights 
obligations towards individuals, and not civil and political human rights. The Inspection Panel pointed 
out that „human rights‟ (making no distinction between categories of rights) were „implicitly embedded 
in various policies of the Bank‟ (2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, IP 
Chairperson Address, at 8).   
3
 Also see section 3.2 below. 
4
 Note that IOs are frequently signatories of treaties concerning financial or economic topics (e.g., 
development, trade, investment) – see e.g., Klabbers 2002, at 40-42; and Alvarez 2005 at 273-337. 
 4 
Both the source and the expression of these heightened expectations is the 
operational policies and procedures (OP&P) of IFIs, which are internal documents 
that contain prescriptions („rules‟, „guidelines‟ and „procedures‟) – addressed to both 
IFI staff and external parties, such as borrowers – concerning the manner in which the 
operations of the organisation ought to be performed. Hence, the OP&P cover a wide 
range of functional areas, such as environmental and social safeguards, procedures to 
be followed when assessing, designing and implementing development projects, and 
technical details such as disbursing funds, preparing for missions etc.
5
 OP&P could be 
– and increasingly are – compared to administrative rules and procedures found in 
domestic law, and as such is evolving into, what is called by some, „global 
administrative law‟ (Kingsbury et al. 2005; Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 2010). 
Moreover, as this report illustrates, the normative significance and 
enforcement potential of the OP&P are being enhanced through regular internal 
policy revision processes and the evolving practice of „Independent Accountability 
Mechanisms‟ (IAMs). IAMs, now present in some form at most IFIs, are internal 
bodies with varying (although significant) degrees of institutional independence that 
are tasked with investigating and/or resolving complaints from people who claim that 
they have been harmed or threatened with harm by the failure of the IFI to comply 
with its OP&P (Shihata 2000; Bradlow 2005; Van Putten 2008). Some of them are 
also mandated to provide advice to the IFI on the further development of its OP&P.
6
 
In other words, the emphasis of the debate concerning the contours of the 
international legal obligations of IOs seems to have shifted over the past two decades 
or so from „getting them to comply‟ with international standards, such as human 
rights standards (especially those contained in the ICCPR) in the abstract, to getting 
IOs to incorporate or „mainstream‟ international human rights and environmental 
standards into their operations.
7
 In this sense, IOs – and the IFIs in particular – are 
                                                 
5
 For more detail, see section 2.1 below. 
6
 These compliance procedures may be triggered internally (e.g., by the IO‟s Executive Board or 
President), by state parties (e.g., in case of a treaty body), or by other external stakeholders (e.g., NGOs 
or individuals). For a comparative perspective on various institutional aspects of the IAMs, see 
Bradlow & Naudé Fourie, in Hale & Held (eds.), forthcoming.  
7
 A sentiment consistently echoed in various initiatives surrounding the UN‟s Millennium 
Development Goals – see http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/. 
 5 
truly becoming law-making bodies through the manner in which they draft, interpret 
and apply their OP&P (Alvarez 2006). 
1.1 This report  
The report focuses on the OP&P of a subset of IFIs, namely, the Multilateral 
Development Banks (MDBs), which specifically includes: the International Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development Association 
(IDA) – the „World Bank‟ (WB);8 the International Finance Corporation (IFC);9 the 
Inter-American Development Bank (IBD);
10
 the Asian Development Bank (ADB);
11
 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD);
12
 and the African 
Development Bank (AfDB).
13
  
The motivation behind this emphasis is twofold. First, OP&P at the MDBs 
have reached a level of detail and scope yet to be reached by most other IOs. For 
example, the World Bank already had a policy on indigenous people – the WB‟s 
Operational Manual Statement „Tribal People in Bank-Financed Projects – in 1982 
(Kingsbury 1999, at 342; Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010, at 202-204). 
Second, the MDBs all have existing IAMs that have undergone a fair degree of 
institutional development and have amassed a significant body of „jurisprudence‟ over 
the past decade or so.
14
   
                                                 
8
 See http://www.worldbank.org/, with emphasis on the WB‟s Inspection Panel (IP) 
(http://www.inspectionpanel.org). 
9
 See http://www.ifc.org/, with emphasis on the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) 
(http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/).  
10
 http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/about-the-inter-american-development-bank,5995.html, with 
emphasis on the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (MICI – as per the Spanish 
acronym) and its predecessor, the Independent Investigation Mechanism 
(http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigation-mechanism-mici,1752.html). 
11
 http://www.adb.org/default.asp, with emphasis on the Accountability Mechanism (AM) 
(http://www.adb.org/Accountability-Mechanism/default.asp).  
12
 http://www.ebrd.com/pages/homepage.shtml, with emphasis on the Project Complaint Mechanism 
(PCM) and its predecessor, the Independent Recourse Mechanism 
(http://www.ebrd.com/russian/pages/about/principles/integrity/pcm.shtml).  
13
 http://www.afdb.org/en/, with emphasis on the Independent Review Mechanism (IRM) 
(http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/).  
14
 See below, note 58.  
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The report will provide a general overview of the content of OP&Ps, their 
formulation, adoption, amendment („rule-making procedures‟) and their enforcement. 
It will highlight three developments that are arguably strengthening the normative 
significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P, namely: the broadening 
stakeholder participation in OP&P revision processes; the „hardening‟ or legalization 
of OP&P through IAM compliance procedures; and the emerging enforcement 
potential of the IAMs. The report will conclude with a few preliminary observations. 
2. Overview of operational policies and procedures 
at multi-lateral development banks 
This section provides an overview of the functional content covered by OP&P at the 
MDBs (2.1), followed by a brief description of the procedures by which OP&P are 
formulated, adopted and amended (2.2) as well as enforced (2.3). For a structured 
comparison between the MDBs, see Appendix 7.1 below. 
2.1 Content 
Over time, the OP&P at MDBs have come to cover all functional areas flowing from 
the main objectives of these institutions, which can be summarized as the provision of 
lending products and related expertise – in line with the MDBs‟ development 
strategies – that support both development projects and programmes in their member 
states.
15
 Consequently, the OP&P of MDBs typically govern the appraisal, design and 
implementation of development projects and programmes; as well as the anticipation, 
prevention and mitigation of various potential adverse effects that may flow from 
these activities.  
2.1.1 Classifying OP&P 
MDBs employ combinations of different categorizations for their OP&P, such as 
sector-specific (e.g., forestry and mining) vs. cross-sectoral policies (e.g., anti-
corruption and procurement policies) and country/region-specific policies (e.g., 
                                                 
15
 For a historic overview of the development of OP&Ps at the WB, see Shihata 2000, at 2-14; 
Kingsbury 1999, at 324-325; and Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 2010, at 202-209. 
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regional and sub-regional cooperation). The most common classifications, however, 
are functional in nature.
16
 For example:  
(1) „safeguard‟ policies that aim to manage various social and environmental 
risks inherent in development projects, and to ensure sustainable development 
(e.g., policies on environmental impact assessments, indigenous people, 
involuntary resettlement);  
(2) public information disclosure policies, clarifying which project-related 
information must be made available to different stakeholders (e.g., project 
affected people (PAP) or civil society), and at what stage of the project cycle;  
(3) management and project supervision policies, which set out MDB 
obligations (often vis-à-vis the borrower) in the appraisal, design, and 
implementation of development projects;  
(4) policies detailing the procedures concerning the MDB‟s independent 
accountability mechanism (IAM), as well as other internal and external 
accountability and development effectiveness measures (e.g., procurement 
policies, and policies ensuring institutional integrity, detecting fraud and 
corruption);
17
 
(5) policies aiding staff in the development and application of its lending 
products (e.g., lending eligibility and terms);  
(6) policies aimed at higher strategic levels in the MDB, such as regional, 
country and sector-specific strategy policies that aim to assist the MDB in its 
formulation of development strategies (e.g., country assistance management, 
poverty reduction). 
Another useful classification increasingly being employed by MDBs concerns 
the differentiation between borrower and. MDB obligations.
18
 The blurred lines of 
                                                 
16
 Another classification might relate to the substantive vs. procedural elements in policies. While most 
OP&P contain both substantive and procedural elements, some focus more on procedural issues (e.g., 
policies setting standards concerning stakeholder consultation and public disclosure of project-related 
information).  
17
 Note that the IAMs‟ „founding documents‟ detailing their operating procedures did not necessarily 
start out as part of the MDBs‟ set of OP&P. For instance, the WBIP‟s founding Resolution and 1996 & 
1999 Board Clarifications on the Resolution were only later formally incorporated into the Bank‟s 
OP&P structure as BP 17.55 (with Resolution and Board Clarifications Annexes to the BP).  
18
 MDBs might also differentiate between policies aimed at public sector vs. private sector clients. 
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responsibility between Banks and borrowers – essentially, where obligations of both 
are stipulated in the same OP&P – has been a consistent contentious issue (Shihata 
2000, at 13) in the history of OP&P evolution. By adopting separate OP&P (on 
similar functional areas) for the MDB and its borrowers (or „clients‟) respectively, 
some of the banks have started to address this problem – especially with regards to 
their private sector clients.
19
 
An intriguing development is the emergence of a tiered structure among the 
OP&P that might even be suggestive of a legal hierarchy.
20
 Formal designations differ 
among the institutions but, roughly speaking, MDBs appear to organize their OP&Ps 
into two levels or tiers. „Policies‟,21 „procedures‟,22 „directives‟,23 or „performance 
standards‟24 that establish norms with which MDB staff and borrowers are required to 
                                                 
19
 See e.g., the IFC‟s set of „Performance Standards for Private Sector Clients‟ vis-à-vis its „Policy on 
Social and Environmental Sustainability‟, „Disclosure Policy‟, and the „Compliance 
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO)‟ policy, which details only its own (MDB) obligations. Also see Daniel 
D. Bradlow and Megan S. Chapman, “Public Participation and the Private Sector: The Role of 
Multilateral Development Banks and the Evolving Legal Standards”, Erasmus Law Review 
(forthcoming).  
20
 See e.g., Klabbers 2002, at 224-226 on the significance of hierarchy among IO „legislative 
instruments‟ or „legal acts‟. 
21
 See e.g., WB definition: „Operational Policies (OPs) are short, focused statements that follow from 
the Bank's Articles of Agreement, the general conditions, and policies approved by the Board. OPs 
establish the parameters for the conduct of operations; they also describe the circumstances under 
which exceptions to policy are admissible and spell out who authorizes exceptions.‟ 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,c
ontentMDK:20249090~menuPK:64701643~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00
.html).  
22
 See e.g., WB definition: „Bank Procedures (BPs) explain how Bank staff carry out the policies set 
out in the OPs. They spell out the procedures and documentation required to ensure Bankwide 
consistency and quality.‟ 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,c
ontentMDK:20249090~menuPK:64701643~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00
.html).  
23
 WB Directives contained both binding and non-binding elements, which lead to some confusion 
among staff, and a primary reason that was given for the OP/BP conversion process – see note 25, 
below. 
24
 See e.g., IFC definition: „IFC's Performance Standards define clients' roles and responsibilities for 
managing their projects and the requirements for receiving and retaining IFC support. The standards 
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comply and, thus, in a sense are „binding‟ might be considered as „upper tier‟ 
OP&P.
25
 „Staff guidelines‟ or „guideline notes‟, „practice notes‟,26 or „best practices‟27 
might be described as „lower tier‟ OP&P, since staff are encouraged to respect them 
(as they will arguably assist staff in making better operational decisions), but MDB 
staff are given discretion to deviate from these lower tier OP&P. The significance of 
this hierarchy is also illustrated by differences concerning their formulation and 
enforcement, as the remaining sub-sections will illustrate.
28
 
2.2 Formulation, adoption and amendment 
The OP&P are formally the products of the MDBs. Their staff compile drafts based 
on whatever input is deemed relevant (e.g., reports from quality assurance or 
operations evaluation departments and/or external sources such as civil society and 
                                                                                                                                            
include requirements to disclose information.‟ 
(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards).  
25
 Note that in terms of this hierarchy, the WB‟s OP/BP classification both fall within the top tier. Both 
OPs and BPs are „binding‟ on staff and borrowers (as relevant); BPs contain more detail than their 
counterpart OPs. On criticism of  the WB‟s reclassification process of Directives and Operational 
Policy Statements to the OP/BP structure, see e.g., P. Bosshard, J. Bruil, K. Horta et al., Gambling with 
People‟s Lives: What the World Bank‟s New “High Risk/High-Reward” Strategy Means for the Poor 
and the Environment, at 39 (2003); and see Clark 2002 at 221: „The Bank‟s systematic process of 
weakening its policy framework represents another internal rebellion against the rule of law. The 
“reformatting” of Bank policies is generally viewed by these outside experts as an attempt to shield the 
Bank from accountability through the Inspection Panel process.‟ 
26
 See e.g., IFC definition: „The Guidance Notes are companion documents to IFC's Performance 
Standards and provide additional guidance to clients (and IFC staff) in fulfilling their roles and 
responsibilities under the standards.‟ 
(http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/sustainability.nsf/Content/PerformanceStandards). 
27
 See e.g., the EBRD‟s description of its „Sub-sectoral environmental and social guidelines‟: The 
EBRD has developed a set of sub-sectoral environmental and social guidelines to assist 
credit/investment officers in local financial institutions and other non-environmental experts. They are 
designed to help in identifying major environmental and social activity risks, important management 
actions, and essential aspects of environmental and social due diligence. The guidelines are not part of 
the Bank's Environmental and Social Procedures and are used as guidance only.‟ 
(http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/what/policies/guidelines.shtml). Also see the AfDB‟s set of OP&P, 
listing a mixture of „policies‟ and „guidelines‟ on their website: 
http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/policy-documents/guidelines-and-procedures/.  
28
 See sections 2.2 and 2.3 below. 
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academia). These draft new policies or proposed revisions of existing ones, 
particularly if they involve significant aspects of MDB operational policies (for 
example so-called „safeguard policies‟) may be made available for public comment 
and then considered and formally adopted by the relevant internal organs, usually 
either the Bank‟s Board of Executive Directors, or its senior management, such as the 
Bank‟s chief executive officer.29  
However, this formal position is being changed by evolving practice. While 
official adoption and amendment procedures remain intact, informal rule-making 
processes that involve extensive stakeholder participation are becoming more 
common, as the next section will illustrate. 
2.2.2. Evolving OP&P review processes  
The lack of (effective) public participation in the review of existing OP&P – 
especially by those who are affected most by the OP&P – has been a consistent point 
of criticism aimed at MDBs in the past (Kingsbury 1999, at 324-325; Boisson de 
Chazournes 1999). The MDBs have gradually started to respond to these comments, 
although not without eliciting additional criticism about the effectiveness of increased 
participation. The WB‟s revision of its Indigenous Peoples Directive in the 1990s, for 
example, was widely criticized for effectively „watering down‟ policy requirements 
even though the Bank initiated a wide consultation process beforehand (Hunter at 199 
in Bradlow & Hunter (eds.) 2010).
30
  
Notwithstanding the mixed success of stakeholder participation in past OP&P 
reviews, a few noticeable trends can be discerned from more recent developments. 
The most evident observation is that most of the OP&P revision processes currently 
underway or recently completed involved invitations for public participation as part of 
the review process. For instance, public participation was involved in the WB‟s 
                                                 
29
 E.g., most of the WB‟s OP&P are issued „under the authority of the [Bank‟s] President‟, by the 
relevant senior Bank management member (Shihata 2000, at 41). 
30
 In addition, when the WB‟s Board of Directors reviewed the Resolution that established the 
Inspection Panel in 1996 and 1999, it involved external stakeholders in both instances – see Shihata 
2000 at 155-203 and Bradlow 1999. Also note that the IMF has reviewed its conditionality policy a few 
years ago, for which it followed a public consultation process. 
 11 
recently concluded major revision of its Disclosure of Information Policy;
31
 in the 
IFC‟s current review of its Policy and Performance Standards on Social and 
Environmental Sustainability and Policy on Disclosure of Information (jointly known 
as its „Sustainability Framework‟), which is expected to be implemented by early 
2011;
32
 in the AfDB‟s review of its accountability mechanism in June 2010;33 and 
was part of the IDB‟s review of its policy regulating its IAM in 201034 and its 
Environment and Safeguards Policy between 2004 and 2006.
35
 The ABD‟s current 
review of its Accountability Mechanism Policy and Public Communication Policy 
(with target completion dates slated for the first half of 2011) provides for public 
participation;
36
 as does the EBRD‟s recent review of its IAM – re-launched in early 
2010 as the „Project Complaint Mechanism‟.37 Public participation was also a feature 
of all nine completed WB policy reviews
38
 and its one ongoing review
39
 since 2002. 
                                                 
31
 Effective since 1 July 2010. The new policy makes a significant portion of documents available (e.g., 
minutes of Board meetings), and works on the principle that „that the World Bank will disclose any 
information in its possession that is not on a list of exceptions‟ (compared to working with a list of 
documents that are available to the public). Another change of note is the possibility of appeal, should 
an individual be refused access to a particular document. See WB Press Release No. 2010/448/EXC of 
3 June 2010, New World Bank Access to Information Policy Takes Effect July 1 at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/EXTPOLICIES/EXTOPMANUAL/0,,co
ntentMDK:22105228~menuPK:51455649~pagePK:64141683~piPK:64141620~theSitePK:502184,00.
html. 
32
 See http://www.ifc.org/policyreview. 
33
 See http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/.  
34
 This review resulted in the replacement of the IDB‟s Independent Investigation Mechanism with the 
new Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism in February 2010 – see 
http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigation-mechanism-mici,1752.html.  
35
 See http://www.iadb.org/features-and-web-stories/2004-11/english/feedback-sought-on-new-idb-
environment-and-safeguards-policy-2179.html.  
36
 See http://www.adb.org/AM-REview/. The ADB also revised the policy on their IAM substantially 
in 2001 – see Hunter at 226 in Bradlow & Hunter 2010. 
37
 For more detail on enforcement-related changes made to the EBRD‟s IAM, see section 3.2 below. 
38
 I.e., Adjustment Lending to Development Policy Lending (2002-04); Conditionality (2007); Country 
Systems in Bank-Supported Operations (2007); Governance and Anticorruption (GAC) (2006-2007); 
GAC Implementation Plans (2007); Monitoring and Evaluation Policy (2006); Eligibility of 
Expenditures in World Bank Lending (2003-04); Use of Country Systems for procurement (2008); and  
the Volcker Report on Department of Institutional Integrity (2007).  
 12 
In general these OP&P reviews seem to be the result of the institutions‟ 
genuine need for their OP&P to reflect evolving practice and the realization that the 
content of the OP&P has to be updated and refined in the light of the lessons in MDB 
operations. The relevance of public participation in this process is reflected in this 
WB statement: 
The World Bank solicits feedback from different stakeholders prior to the adoption of new or 
significantly changed sector or thematic strategies, policies or other documents that affect 
Bank operations. The objectives are to capture the experience and knowledge of various 
audiences, to give voice to the poor, and to increase transparency and citizen involvement in 
development decision making […]. Through consultations, the World Bank Group is able to 
tap into a broad range of perspectives. It strives to integrate comments and new ideas into its 
operations, policies and final documents.
40
 
This statement also highlights that fact broad stakeholder participation, in fact, 
is becoming a regular part of the review process. All OP&P revisions identified above 
involve(d) extensive, pre-announced consultation programmes involving external 
stakeholders, over extended periods of time.
41
  
The IFC‟s review of its Sustainability Framework serves as a particularly good 
example.
42
 A separate section of the IFC‟s website has been dedicated to the review, 
with the timeline, consultation process, milestones and outcomes clearly defined, and 
all (interim) documentation surrounding the review easily accessible. Consultation is 
opened to any party, which can register for various sessions held around the world 
                                                                                                                                            
39
 I.e., the World Bank‟s Whistle-blowing Policy, available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21624514~pagePK:6425704
3~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html. 
40
 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21807601~menuPK:506
8208~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html. MDBs have also become increasingly 
convinced of the link between „process rights and development effectiveness‟ – see Hunter in Bradlow 
& Hunter 2010, at 209-211. 
41
 For a description of an evolving eight-stage policy-making process, see Hunter in Bradlow & Hunter 
2010, at 223-232.  
42
 See above, note 32. 
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during each stage of the three-phased process,
43
 and comments on draft policy 
versions from previous stages of the process are facilitated via the website.
44
 
To conclude, while public participation in these rule-making processes has 
still not been formalized or „codified‟ in a „policy about policies‟,45 current OP&P 
reviews seem to have embedded stakeholder consultation in MDB practice.  
2.3 Enforcement mechanisms 
All MDBs have established fairly extensive institutional frameworks to ensure 
consistent enforcement of the OP&P throughout their institutions and across all their 
borrowers. For instance, a variety of internal bodies have been put in place to ensure 
institutional compliance, such as departments charged with ensuring more systemic 
compliance
46
 (e.g., evaluations departments that take a retroactive view and quality 
assurance departments that take a proactive view on compliance performance of 
individual projects) and others mandated specifically to investigate specific instances 
of alleged non-compliance (e.g., institutional integrity units and IAMs through their 
compliance functions, although non-compliance might also come to light in the course 
of their problem solving stages).
47
 As far as the institutional mandate of the IAMs is 
concerned, it is important to note that it is usually limited to „upper level‟ OP&P (or 
certain subsets within it, such as safeguard policies).
48
 Hence, it is controversial when 
an MDB „deregulates‟ certain aspects of a policy to the „lower level‟ OP&P as it 
effectively narrows the IAM‟s enforcement mandate.49 
                                                 
43
 http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/ConsultationEventsRegistration. 
44
 http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/policyreview.nsf/Content/ProvideInput. 
45
 For arguments supporting the „codification of administrative procedures at IFIs‟, see Hunter in 
Bradlow & Hunter 2010, at 232-237. 
46
 Interestingly, the WB is currently conducting a review of all five of its internal independent 
evaluation and review mechanisms.  
47
 IAMs, with the exception of the WB‟s IP, typically fulfil two functions: dispute-resolution in a 
„problem-solving phase‟ and compliance assurance in a „compliance phase‟ – see Bradlow & Naudé 
Fourie, in Hale & Hand (eds.) forthcoming.  
48
 E.g., the WB IP Mandate‟s specifically excludes the Best Practice Guidelines „and similar documents 
or statements‟ (Inspection Panel 1993 Resolution, para. 12); however, all IAMs‟ mandates cover 
„safeguard or sustainable development‟ OP&P (see above, section 2.1.1).  
49
 See above, note 25. 
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A point of criticism made in this context has been the lack of internal 
sanctions used against Bank staff in cases of proven non-compliance, especially in 
cases of findings more systemic non-compliance.
50
 While this is a valid concern as it 
points to the question of the effective functioning of IAMs and to MDB staff and 
management‟s perception of the IAMs, this criticism must be viewed in context. 
Although it is certainly possible that there are cases of „repeat offenders‟ among staff, 
it is more likely that the major problems concerning OP&P compliance arise from the 
complexity of the projects being funded by the MDBs, staff uncertainty about how to 
apply the policies (which, in turn, is sometimes caused by mixed messages from 
management),
51
 gaps in the available knowledge, or staff succumbing to time and cost 
pressures. 
 Borrower compliance with OP&P, on the other hand, is generally ensured by 
(the threat of) legal sanctions (such as suspension of loan disbursements, or 
withdrawal of the loan) since the relevant OP&P are typically incorporated into the 
loan agreement between bank and borrower. MDBs have been criticized in the past 
for not employing these enforcement strategies in face of glaring borrower non-
compliance; or at least not consistently, leading to the unequal treatment of 
borrowers.
52
 
Interestingly, all MDBs specifically mention their public information 
disclosure policies as a crucial element of their compliance framework – the logic 
being that increased transparency (and the increased public scrutiny following from 
this) leads to better conditions for ensuring institutional compliance with OP&P. The 
trend certainly has been to disclose more information over the years. In fact, the WB‟s 
recently amended „Access to Information Policy‟ adopted an even broader approach: 
                                                 
50
 An exception would be institutional integrity cases where individuals are held accountable for fraud 
allegations, etc. 
51
 E.g., in the WB IP‟s 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project case, the Panel noted „an 
unusually and disturbingly wide range of divergent and, often, opposing views‟ between Bank staff – 
including senior management – „on how the Bank‟s operational policies and procedures should be 
applied.‟ (IR (ES), para. 9). 
52
 See below, note 68. The WB‟s IP also picked up on this problem in the 1999 China Western Poverty 
Reduction Project case, noting recurring staff opinions that „in China things are done differently‟ (IR 
(ES), para. 14).  
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project-related information is in principle available to the public, with the exception 
of a few specific documents.
53
 
Clearly, as have been illustrated by some of the examples mentioned above, 
the mere existence of such enforcement mechanisms says very little about their 
effectiveness. This issue, and particularly the role that IAMs are playing in the 
realizing the enforcement potential of the OP&P, will be discussed in more detail in 
the next section. 
3. Strengthening the normative significance and 
enforcement potential of the OP&P 
This report argues that, although there remains much scope for improvement,
54
 the 
normative significance and enforcement potential of the OP&P at MDBs are being 
strengthened as a result of three major developments in the evolution of the OP&P, 
namely: increased public scrutiny of the OP&P through enhanced stakeholder 
participation in the OP&P review process (discussed in section 2.2.2. above); a 
“hardening” of the OP&P as a result of IAM compliance procedures (discussed in 
section 3.1 below); and ongoing institutional development occurring at most IAMs, 
resulting in a potential enhancement of their enforcement role (discussed in section 
3.2 below). 
3.1 “Hardening” the OP&P through IAM compliance 
procedures 
The potential of the OP&P to evolve into more than mere norms that promote better 
standards in MDB operations has long been recognised (Kingsbury 1999), which 
means that they can be used to hold MDBs responsible for their actions and even 
contribute to the normative development of international law in particular areas. This 
conclusion followed from the fact that the IAMs, in exercising their compliance 
review mandates,
55
 logically had to interpret the OP&P in order to determine whether 
or not the MDBs have been in compliance with the provisions in question.  
                                                 
53
 See above, note 31.  
54
 See section 4 below. 
55
 This section will focus on the compliance procedures / phases of the IAMs, not the problem-solving 
phase that usually precedes it. 
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Prior to the establishment of the IAMs, this interpretative function was the 
exclusive responsibility of the MDB management and staff, including the Banks‟ 
legal departments, which would be asked to interpret the policies whenever a 
particular issue implicated the Bank‟s legal obligations.56 The establishment of the 
IAMs created the potential for the IAMs and the Management and staff to follow 
different interpretations of the OP&Ps, which are drafted in relatively broad language 
and often without great detail or precision on how they should be applied. These 
differences in interpretation compel the institutional entity responsible for final 
approval of the IAM‟s compliance review reports (usually, the Bank‟s Board of 
Executive Directors) to decide which OP&P interpretation to accept. This is a new 
function for the MDB‟s Boards of Directors and has created a challenge for them 
because they often feel ill-equipped to choose between the different interpretations. 
However, as we will illustrate below, it can be argued that the IAMs‟ 
interpretations of particular OP&P have come to carry increasing weight within the 
institutions, especially in the World Bank context (Shihata 2000; Naudé Fourie 2009, 
at 193-250). We suggest that the primary contribution of the IAMs in enhancing the 
normative significance of the OP&P is their „hardening‟ or, „legalization‟ of the 
OP&P through the exercise of their compliance review mandate.
57
 Such a claim is 
potentially difficult to substantiate without employing a sound analytical framework, 
such as the conceptual model describing the legalization process developed by Abbot 
et al. This model identifies three dimensions of legalization, namely: „obligation‟ (the 
extent to which an actor is „legally bound by a rule or commitment in the sense that 
their behavior thereunder is subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures, 
and discourse of international law‟); „precision‟ (whether the „rules unambiguously 
define the conduct they require, authorize, or proscribe‟); and „delegation‟ (i.e., third 
parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the rules; to 
                                                 
56
 IAMs have to consult Bank‟s legal department about interpretation of OP&P, but only when it‟s a 
question of MDB legal obligations. See e.g., WB IP 1999 Resolution, para. 15. 
57
 Note that the term „legalization‟ does not necessarily have a positive connotation in the IAM context. 
During the early years of the WBIP, the Panel – and external commentators – often accused Bank 
management of being overly „legalistic‟, i.e., formalistically sticking to the letter of the IP Resolution 
or specific OP&P provisions. See e.g., See 1995 Tanzania Power IV Project, ER, at para. 8; 1996 
Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, Review & Assessment, at 48-49; and 2005 
Cambodia Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project, IR (ES) at 22-23. 
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resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules‟) (Abbot et al., in Goldstein et 
al. (eds.) 2001, at 17-34). Moreover, the model contends that each of these dimensions 
form a continuum, which allow for relative comparisons between different norms and 
(quasi-) legal entities responsible for normative development – see Figure 1 below.  
 
Figure 1: Dimensions of legalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We use this model to analyse the extent to which the IAMs have “legalized” 
the OP&P. In other words: are the IAMs contributing to the strengthening of the 
OP&P from expressly non-legal forms to stronger, binding rules (obligation)? Are 
they strengthening particular OP&P provisions from being vague principles to 
stronger elaborate rules (precision)? And are the IAMs, through their persistence in 
interpreting the OP&P, also gradually moving the MDBs to accept a model where the 
normative development of the OP&P is increasingly being entrusted to the IAMs 
(delegation)? 
It might be argued that the IAMs have had an insufficient number of 
compliance reviews („jurisprudence‟) to answer these questions conclusively. This is 
particular applicable to the IAMs at the regional development banks, most of which 
have recently undergone institutional review and reform (as section 3.2 will 
elaborate). The World Bank‟s Inspection Panel (WBIP), on the other hand, which has 
been active since 1994 and has not undergone an institutional review since 1999, has 
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accumulated a fair number of compliance review cases.
58
 The Panel has furthermore 
been the subject of a fair amount of research. The remainder of this section will 
therefore use the WBIP as basis for the analysis.  
3.1.1 Illustrative: The World Bank’s Inspection Panel 
Strengthening the obligatory nature of OP&P 
It appears that substantial confusion exists among WB Bank staff, management and 
Board members about the nature of OP&Ps: are they „strict marching orders‟ to be 
closely followed by Bank staff and borrowers,
59
 or do they allow for considerable 
leeway, or „managerial discretion‟?60 This uncertainty was clearly demonstrated in the 
IP‟s landmark China Qinghai case (1999-2000). The Panel acknowledged that the 
OP&P (most still styled as „directives‟ at that point) did allow for some managerial 
discretion, but insisted that  
the directives cannot possibly be taken to authorize a level of “interpretation” and “flexibility” 
that would permit those who must follow these directives to simply override the portions of 
the directives that are clearly binding.
61
  
WB management in turn criticized the Inspection Panel‟s position, arguing that 
„[m]any of the Panel‟s findings appear […] to be based on an application of elements 
of each policy as legally binding rules, allowing for little or no flexibility or room for 
judgement‟.62 The case itself did not put a conclusive end to the debate, but it proved 
to be indicative of what was to come: while the Bank continued to clarify the 
obligatory nature of its OP&P through the so-called conversion process into 
                                                 
58
 As of March 2010, the WBIP has registered 71 compliance review cases. Compare this with the 
ADB (3 compliance review cases since 2003); IDB (7 compliance review cases in total); AfDB (6 
requests for both compliance reviews and problem solving); and EBRD (4 requests since new 
mechanism was adopted in 2010). The possible exception would the IFC‟s CAO, which, as of March 
2011, has registered over 50 cases (with 11 cases going to compliance review) since its inception. 
59
 Shihata 2000, at 41-49. 
60
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR (ES), at para. 15. 
61
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR (ES), at para. 11.  
62
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, MR, at paras. 2.2.2 & 2.4; and MR to IR, at para. 
20. 
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OP/BP/GP,
63
 the Panel persisted in its approach of setting out the contours of 
managerial discretion – as the next point will illustrate. 
The language of some of the OP&P makes it clear that they allow for some 
„professional judgement‟ or „managerial discretion‟.64 On the one hand, this flexibility 
in the text allows the IP to adopt expansive interpretation techniques.
65
 On the other 
hand, it erodes the obligatory nature of the OP&P. There are numerous examples in 
the IP‟s investigation reports of instances where the IP has explicitly delineated (and 
as a practical result, effectively limited) management discretion. For instance, the IP 
repeatedly rejected WB management‟s arguments that the exercise of its legal 
remedies against the borrower was „not a requirement but a discretionary tool, to be 
applied only after other reasonable means of persuasion have failed‟;66 or that it was 
„a matter for the judgment of Management, taking into account all the circumstances 
of each case‟, and that a decision not to suspend loan disbursements, for example, was 
„neither a sign of negligence nor of lack of concern‟.67 The IP rejected these 
arguments in a number of cases, countering that its founding Resolution explicitly 
listed as „an instance of failure in the compliance of Bank policies and procedures 
situations where the Bank has “failed in its follow-up on the borrower‟s obligations 
under loan agreements with respect to such policies or procedures”‟.68 Another 
example where the Panel has repeatedly challenged Managerial discretion, and thus 
strengthened the obligatory nature of the relevant provisions, concerns the 
environmental screening of projects. Over the years, the Panel has questioned the 
screening of several projects that Bank Management has deemed to be lower risk 
(„category B‟) and found the project to be in non-compliance with the relevant OP&P 
                                                 
63
 See above, note 25. 
64
 See below, note 72. 
65
 See Naudé Fourie 2009, at 231-244. 
66
 1996 Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, MR, at para. 1.8. 
67
 1997 India NTPC Power Generation Project, MR, at 3. Also see 1995 Brazil Rodônia Natural 
Resources Management Project, MR, at para. 4. 
68
 1996 Paraguay/Argentina Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project, ER, at paras. 30-31. Also see 1995 Brazil 
Rodônia Natural Resources Management Project, Additional Review, at paras. 55-56; 1997 India 
NTPC Power Generation Project, MR, at para. 3. Compare to 2004 India Mumbai Urban Road 
Transport, where the Bank exercised one of its legal rights (suspension of funds) in the light of the 
Inspection Panel‟s findings (India Mumbai Urban Road Transport, MR to IR, at para. 89). 
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since it should have been classified as a higher environmental risk project („category 
A‟).69 Importantly, the IP rejected Bank management‟s claim that the environmental 
screening of projects was solely a management prerogative for which there cannot be 
a consistent interpretation, since  
[s]creening a project into either Category A or B requires judgement about the overall risks 
(type of project, location, environmental sensitivity) of the project as well as the nature and 
magnitude of potential impacts. How the risks and impacts are judged depends on the specific 
project involved.
70
 
The Panel‟s consistent counterargument has been that the appropriateness of a 
particular environmental screening depended on a „straightforward‟ interpretation of 
the particular OP&P provisions, which was exactly what the Panel did when it 
conducted its compliance review.
71
 
Adding to the precision of particular OP&P provisions 
Like all rules with normative content, OP&P contain concepts and phrases that are 
(often deliberately) vague – i.e., they require interpretation in order to strengthen their 
precision with regards to a particular case or in order to have broader application.
72
 
                                                 
69
 See e.g., 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project; 2004 Pakistan National Drainage 
Program Project; and 2005 Cambodia Forest Concession Management and Control Pilot Project. 
There were also a number of projects where the IP concurred with Management‟s project classification, 
although it specifically reviewed whether the classification was in line with the OP&P in those 
instances – see e.g., 1999 Kenya Lake Victoria Environmental Management Project (the Panel 
concurred with Management‟s categorization of „B‟); 1999 Ecuador Mining Development and 
Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project (the Panel concurred with Management‟s 
categorization of ‟A‟); 2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project (the Panel concurred 
with Management‟s categorization of „A‟); 2001 Uganda Third Power Project, Fourth Power Project, 
and proposed Bujagali Hydropower Project (the Panel concurred with Management‟s categorization of 
„B‟); and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project 
(the Panel concurred with Management‟s categorization of „A‟). 
70
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, Request, at 4; and MR, at 64 
71
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 152. 
72
 Consider, e.g., these phrases from OP&P: „[t]he Bank favors preventive measures over mitigatory or 
compensatory measures, whenever feasible‟ (OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), at para. 2 
(emphasis added); and „the Bank satisfies itself that the borrower has explored all viable alternative 
project designs to avoid physical displacement of these [indigenous] groups. When it is not feasible to 
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The IP‟s growing jurisprudence is making a significant contribution to making several 
of these concepts and phrases more precise, and thereby also clarifying the obligations 
of the WB towards PAP. For instance, the phrase „meaningful and informed 
consultation‟ comes up in several of the Bank‟s OP&P, and has lead to 
misunderstandings and widely differing expectations between Bank staff and PAP.
73
 
Over the years, the Panel has shaped the substantive and procedural content of this 
phrase, often describing what it was not.
74
 Specifically, the Panel ruled on several 
occasions that it wasn‟t good enough for Bank management merely to confirm that 
consultation „has taken place‟75 as the content of those consultation sessions were of 
paramount importance. For instance, „information sessions‟ did not constitute 
„meaningful consultations‟. As the Panel commented in the 1999 Ecuador Mining 
Development case: 
It is worth noting that Management does not categorize these meetings „to consult‟ but rather 
as meetings “to inform” […]. In the Panel‟s view, Management‟s approach to consultation 
was unfortunate. If there was proper CONSULTATION, “[c]onducted in the spirit of the 
OD”, Management could have addressed these concerns long ago or prevented many of the 
issues raised by the Requesters.
76
 
The very notion of „compliance‟ is another example where the IP added a 
degree of precision through its substantive and procedural development of the 
                                                                                                                                            
avoid such displacement, preference is given to land-based resettlement strategies […].‟ (OP 4.12 
(Involuntary Resettlement), at para. 9 (emphasis added). 
73
 See e.g., 1999 Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance 
Project, IR paras. 52, 57 & 103; 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project 
and Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project, IR, at paras. 421 & 437; and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water 
Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Management Project, IR (ES), at 21 and IR, at para. 240. 
74
 E.g., consultations could not take place in the presence of government officials and armed guards 
(1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, Request, at 9; MR, at 74-75; and IR, at para. 116; and 
2001 Chad Petroleum Development & Pipeline Project, IR (ES), at paras. 26 & 37); and surveys used 
in the consultation process had to guarantee the anonymity of participants (1999 China Western 
Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 116). 
75
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at para. 116. 
76
 1999 Ecuador Mining Development and Environmental Control Technical Assistance Project, IR, at 
paras. 52, 57 & 103 (emphasis, in bold, in the original). Also see 2004 India Mumbai Urban Transport 
Project, IR, at para. 372; and 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project and 
Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project, IR, at para. 421. 
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concept. In essence, the Panel argues that a mere „process‟ or formalistic approach to 
compliance is typically not enough to ensure that a project is compliant with an 
OP&P. For example, an environmental assessment that meets all the formal criteria 
set out in the OP&P could still be inadequate when the substantive quality is taken 
into account. As the Panel concluded in the China Qinghai case: 
[…] in appraising compliance, Management had an obligation to satisfy itself not only that the 
process and procedures mandated by the policies had been followed, but also that the work 
under review met professionally acceptable standards of quality. In other words, both process 
and quality were essential components of compliance.
77
 
Strengthening the delegation of interpretative functions 
This dimension of legalization is arguably the weakest of the three since the IP is not 
solely tasked with providing authoritative interpretations of the OP&P; and, as many 
of the examples mentioned in this section illustrated, Bank management and the IP 
frequently supports entirely opposite interpretation. Formally speaking, the 
interpretation that stands will be the one accepted by the Bank‟s Board of Executive 
Directors. However, to the extent that the Board continues its practice of usually 
accepting the Inspection Panel‟s Investigations Reports without specific comment, 
this procedure does not necessarily clarify the particular position.
78
 Whether Bank 
management and staff actually accept the delegation of interpretative functions to the 
IP might also be questioned, as the phenomenon of „panel proofing‟ (i.e., actions 
taken by Bank staff simply to avoid or limit an Inspection Panel investigation) 
illustrates.
79
 
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Panel‟s interpretations of OP&P 
have steadily gained in credibility over the years – compare, for instance, earlier 
Management Responses (MR) to IP investigation reports (where most Panel findings 
were rejected, with very little remedial action being proposed or undertaken by the 
Bank in light of the IP reports) with later MRs that acknowledge most Panel 
                                                 
77
 1999 China Western Poverty Reduction Project, IR, at paras. 180- 186. 
78
 See e.g., Shihata 2000, at 37-41 on early controversy regarding the meaning of the word „project‟ in 
the IP Resolution (which affected the scope of the IP‟s mandate). 
79
 E.g., Clark 2002, at 221-222; and see in general, Fox 2000. On panel proofing, also see note 25, 
above. 
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findings.
80
 Or consider Management‟s proposals to engage in discussion with the IP 
on what „compliance‟ might mean in certain circumstances:  
[i]n conducting EAs, the question of how much data is enough frequently arises, given the 
need to make case-by-case judgments on the type and amount of data to be collected […]. In 
the case of the pipeline, Management considered the trade-offs, because the data collected did 
provide a sufficient basis for mitigative measures through the EASs and for monitoring. In the 
context of the Pipeline Project, Management would welcome an occasion to exchange views 
with the Inspection Panel on what should constitute adequate data collection.
81
 
Regardless of which of the two positions is a more accurate reflection of the 
internal perception at the Bank, it can be said with certainty that the IP‟s 
interpretations of the OP&P have come to serve as the benchmark for shaping PAP 
and their representative‟s expectations concerning their rights vis-à-vis the Bank.  
3.2 Enhancing enforcement potential through institutional 
reforms of IAMs  
A consistent criticism of the WBIP process has been the lack of formalized Panel and 
Requester involvement in the development and implementation of Management 
remedial action plans (i.e., strengthening of the „enforcement‟ elements of the 
process).
82
 It is one matter to find, often pervasive, occurrences of non-compliance 
with OP&P; it is another matter altogether to ensure that those specific instances are 
                                                 
80
 Compare e.g., the MR in 2001 India Coal Sector Environmental and Social Mitigation Project and 
Coal Sector Rehabilitation Project (see MR to IR, Annex 1 – where Management „noted‟ the Panel‟s 
findings of non-compliance in many instances, but concluded that there was „no action to be taken‟ or 
that the Bank would „continue supervision‟ – see e.g., action numbers 1, 3, 4, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 17, 21, 
22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 31), with later MRs such in 2004 Pakistan National Drainage Program Project 
(e.g., in this case, Management acknowledged that categorizing the project as a „category B‟ for 
environmental assessment purposes was „premature‟ and „that it would have been more appropriate to 
categorize this as an EA category “A” project.‟ (MR, at para. 43)); and 2005 Cambodia Forest 
Concession Management & Control Pilot Project (where „Management acknowledges that the project 
did not succeed in adequately addressing the concerns of local communities and Indigenous Peoples.‟ 
(MR to IR, at para. 23)). 
81
 2002 Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project, and Petroleum Environment Capacity 
Enhancement Project, MR to IR, at para. 28 (also see para. 23 for another example). 
82
 See Horta 2002. This criticism is also echoed in the comment that new accountability mechanisms do 
little to provide claimants with real redress or remedies – see e.g., Wellens 2002, at 266-267. 
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remedied, and even more so if the non-compliance point to systemic policy failures. 
In the case of the WBIP, no such enforcement role was foreseen for either the Panel 
or the claimants. In fact, the Bank‟s Board has emphatically decided to stop Panel 
involvement post the delivery of the Investigation Report (which had developed in 
practice).
83
 Yet, practice has continued to evolve in a different direction – albeit at the 
discretion of the Bank‟s Board. For instance, the Board has formally requested the 
Panel to remain engaged in the remedial phase in controversial cases such as 2002 
Paraguay / Argentina (Yacyretá) and 2004 India Mumbai Urban Road Transport; 
while a recently implemented section on the IP‟s website („Post-Investigations 
Progress Reports and Actions‟) list current IP post-investigation involvement in nine 
cases.
84
 
Over time, the other MDBs have enhanced the enforcement potential of their 
respective IAM and the original complainants. The IFC‟s Compliance Advisory 
Ombudsman, for example, is specifically tasked with an enforcement role,
85
 and the 
IDB‟s accountability mechanism may get involved in post-investigation monitoring at 
request of the Board,
86
 while the AfDB‟s IAM is permitted to make recommendations 
regarding potential remedies, although it has no formal enforcement role.
87
 
                                                 
83
 See 1999 Board Review Conclusions, at para. 16: „The Board should not ask the Panel for its view 
on other aspects of the [Bank management] action plans nor would it ask the Panel to monitor the 
implementation of the action plans.‟ 
84
 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/Resources/PostInvestions_Progress_Rep
orts_and_actions_July_2010.pdf, accessed 14 March 2011. The Panel‟s website also shows „follow up 
report‟ in several other older cases – see e.g., 1995 Brazil Rondônia Natural Resources Management 
Project (progress report in 1997); 1996 Bangladesh Jamuna Multipurpose Bridge Project (progress 
report in 1998); and 2004 Colombia Cartagena Water Supply, Sewerage and Environmental Project 
(progress report in 2006) – available at 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/0,,contentMDK:2022160
6~menuPK:4766130~pagePK:64129751~piPK:64128378~theSitePK:380794,00.html. 
85
 See http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/howwework/compliance/.  
86
 Para. 72, Policy Establishing the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism of 17 
February 2010, available at http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/independent-consultation-and-investigation-
mechanism-mici,1752.html.  
87
 Paras. 52(c) and 60, The Independent Review Mechanism, Operating Rules and Procedures of 16 
June 2010, available at http://www.afdb.org/en/about-us/structure/independent-review-mechanism/.  
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However, at this moment, recent institutional reforms of the EBRD‟s Project 
Complaint Mechanism (PCM) appear to go furthest in enhancing the enforcement 
potential of the IAM. For instance, in the course of processing a complaint the 
„Project Complaints Mechanism Officer‟ (PCM Officer) can make an interim 
recommendation to the relevant EBRD body to suspend Bank payments;
88
 in cases of 
non-compliance findings, compliance review experts are specifically required to make 
recommendations to 
a. address the findings of non-compliance at the level of EBRD systems or procedures to 
avoid a recurrence of such or similar occurrences; and/or 
b. address the findings of non-compliance in the scope or implementation of the Project taking 
account of prior commitments by the Bank or the Client in relation to the Project; and 
c. monitor and report on the implementation of any recommended changes.
89
 
while the PCM Officer is specifically tasked with monitoring „the implementation of 
the recommendations of the Compliance Review Report subject to the timetable and 
estimate of human and financial resources as set in the Management Action Plan‟.90 
Moreover, complainants are given the opportunity to comment on the Compliance 
Review Report and the Management Action Plan, and those comments are also 
included in the final set of reports ultimately submitted to the Bank‟s Board.91  
Clearly, further research into this area is required – especially into the growing 
body of „jurisprudence‟ of the IFC‟s CAO, the IDB‟s MICI, the ADB‟s AM, the 
AfDB‟s IRM, and the EBRD‟s PCM – before any definitive conclusions can be 
drawn. What is clear, however, is that the evolving enforcement role of the IAMs at 
MDBs has the potential to further strengthen the normative development of the 
OP&Ps, and to further clarify MDB obligations vis-à-vis a variety of stakeholders. 
4. Preliminary observations 
This report provided an overview of the content, formulation, adoption, amendment 
and enforcement of OP&P at the MDBs. It highlighted the impact of three recent 
                                                 
88
 Para. 30, Project Complaint Mechanism, Rules of Procedures of, available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/pages/project/pcm/about.shtml.  
89
 Para. 40, id. 
90
 Para. 44, id. 
91
 Paras. 42 & 43, id. 
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developments that are strengthening the normative significance and enforcement 
potential of the OP&P, namely: broadening stakeholder participation in OP&P 
revision processes; „hardening‟ or legalization of OP&P through IAM compliance 
procedures; and emerging enforcement potential of the IAMs.  
This section will set out a few preliminary observations drawn from the report; 
and explore potential implications for IO responsibility. 
i) All OP&P, in principle, are in the public domain and have become 
increasingly accessible to the general public through their publication on the 
internet. While this degree of transparency is commendable, locating complete 
catalogues of OP&P on the websites of the MDBs is not necessarily a 
straightforward exercise – and almost certainly not for all people affected by 
MDB development projects (including their civil society allies) who 
increasingly consult the OP&P as a means of ascertaining their „rights‟ against 
the MDBs (Hunter 2003. at 204). Given the growing importance of the OP&P 
for external parties, and not only for internal staff members and borrowers, the 
MDBs should ensure that the OP&P are located in more prominent areas of 
their websites – the layout of which, in fairness, continues to be improved on a 
regular basis. 
ii) The MDBs have been making significant progress in facilitating broad 
stakeholder participation in their OP&P review processes; however, such 
participation remains at the discretion of the MDB, and has not been 
formalized (or, „codified‟), for example, through the adoption of a „policy 
about policies‟.92 We suggest that this should be a logical next step now that 
the practice of stakeholder participation in OP&P reviews have become more 
firmly embedded in the institutional culture. 
iii) The ongoing normative development of OP&P is fuelled by public 
participation in review processes and by the ability of non-state actors to 
                                                 
92
 To some extent, some policies establishing the IAMs would seem to be an exception – see e.g., para. 
69 of the EBRD‟s Project Complaint Mechanism‟s Rules of Procedure: „The PCM will be reviewed by 
the Board every three (3) years or as needed.‟ And see para. 99 of the IDB‟s Policy Establishing the 
Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism: „Two (2) years after the effective date of the 
Mechanism, the Board shall request an independent evaluation of the Mechanism. On the basis of such 
evaluation, and any comments thereon from Management, the Board will assess the experience with 
Mechanism.‟ 
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initiate the compliance procedures of IAMs. Both are driving the 
strengthening of the obligatory nature of the OP&Ps and the clarification of 
substantive and procedural MDB obligations – especially towards third parties 
in a non-contractual relationship with them. 
iv) A key area for future development with regards to OP&P rule making 
procedures, as well as the effective implementation / „operationalization‟ of 
the O&P& at MDBs, concerns the further enhancement of the IAMs‟ 
enforcement role. Currently, their enforcement role, if it exists at all, is limited 
to making recommendations and monitoring the implementation of the 
remedial action plan developed by the Bank Management. 
v) The evolution of OP&P at the MDBs, and the role played by the IAMs in this 
regard, potentially hold broader implications for ensuring IO responsibility, 
and for international law as a whole. For instance: 
 Given the significance of MDBS in the international arena (the WB and IFC in 
particular), current OP&P review processes may be developing rules for 
public participation at the international level – „administrative‟ rules which 
appear to be lacking or, at least underdeveloped in conventional international 
law discourse.  
 The normative development of the substantive and procedural aspects of legal 
concepts and constructs such as „consultation‟ and „compliance‟ through 
IAMs enforcement processes, for instance, has potential value beyond the 
MDB context.  
 Since the OP&P also deal with issues that raise important international law 
questions – such as rights of indigenous people, compensation for 
involuntarily resettled people, the responsibilities of actors for the 
environmental consequences of their actions – their formulation and 
interpretation can contribute to the development of international law on these 
issues. It remains noticeable, however, that the IAMs continue to make scant 
references to existing international legal standards and soft law – which, 
arguably weakens its broader contribution to international law.  
 Since MDBs are not the only IOs that are engaged in actions that directly 
affect the citizens of their member states (other examples are the UN‟s 
operations relating to refugees, humanitarian assistance, governance), the 
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example of the IAMs at multilateral development banks sets standards for 
accountability and responsibility of IOs that has relevance for all IOs.  
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Structured comparison of OP&P at MDBs 
Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
World Bank
93
 Poverty reduction 
Country assistance management 
Lending eligibility and terms 
Safeguard policies: 
Piloting the Use of Borrower Systems 
to Address Environmental and Social 
Safeguard Issues in Bank-Supported 
Projects  
Environmental Assessment  
Environmental Action Plans  
Natural Habitats  
Water Resources Management  
Pest Management  
Indigenous Peoples  
Social Assessment  
Indigenous Peoples Plan  
Physical Cultural Resources  
Most operational policies and 
procedures are issued “under the 
authority of the [Bank‟s] President”, 
by the relevant senior Bank 
management member. Some policies, 
such as the „Safeguard policies‟, are 
discussed by the Board in draft format 
before they are adopted by Bank 
management. (Shihata 2000, at 41-42) 
Inspection Panel (IP) 
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) 
Quality Assurance Group (QAG) 
World Bank's Department of 
Institutional Integrity (INT) 
 
                                                 
93
 http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:21807601~menuPK:5068208~pagePK:41367~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html.  
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
Involuntary Resettlement  
Gender and Development  
Forests  
Safety of Dams 
Bank financing 
Legal aspects of lending 
Emergency and other lending 
instruments 
Investment lending and the 
Montreal Protocol 
Procurement 
Disbursement 
Sanctions 
Debt 
Supervision 
External resource mobilization and 
aid coordination 
Inspection Panel and 
communications with individual 
executive directors 
Information Disclosure 
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
International 
Finance 
Corporation
94
 
Disclosure of information 
Social and environmental 
sustainability policy
95
 
Performance standards:
96
 
Social and Environmental Assessment 
and Management Systems  
Labor and Working Conditions  
Pollution Prevention and Abatement  
Community Health, Safety and 
Security  
Land Acquisition and Involuntary 
Resettlement  
Biodiversity Conservation and 
Sustainable Natural Resource 
Management  
Indigenous Peoples  
Cultural Heritage 
IFC’s exclusions list97 
 
Compiled by internal working 
committees; 
Submitted to Board of Executive 
Director's Committee on 
Development Effectiveness (CODE) 
Adopted (and amendments approved) 
by IFC‟s Board of Executive 
Directors – no formal participation-
related or consultation requirements. 
Compliance Advisor/ Ombudsman 
Independent Evaluation Group 
World Bank's Department of 
Institutional Integrity (INT) 
                                                 
94
 http://www.ifc.org/disclosure.  
95
 Defining IFC responsibilities. 
96
 Defining IFC borrower („client‟) responsibilities. The disclosure of information policy, social and environmental sustainable policy and the performance standards together 
constitute the IFC‟s „sustainability framework‟. 
97
 Listing project types the IFC are not allowed to finance. 
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
Inter-American 
Development Bank
98
 
General Operational Policies: 
Disclosure of information 
Operations programming 
Lending policies 
Technical cooperation 
Procurement of goods and services 
Subregional financial institutions 
Sector Policies: 
Multisectoral Policies: 
Preinvestment 
Intraregional Export Financing for 
Goods and Services 
Financing of exports through the 
Venezuelan trust fund 
Environment and Safeguards 
Compliance 
Natural Disaster Risk Management 
Use of Intermediate or Light Capital 
Technologies 
Social Entrepreneurship Program 
Maintenance and Conservation of 
Physical Works and Equipment 
Public Utilities 
Subloan Interest Rates 
Involuntary Resettlement 
Compiled by several internal working 
committees; 
Adopted (and amendments approved) 
by IDB‟s Board of Executive 
Directors – no formal participation-
related or consultation requirements. 
Office of Institutional Integrity 
Independent Consultation and 
Investigation Mechanism (MICI) 
Office of Evaluation and Oversight 
                                                 
98
 http://www.iadb.org/en/about-us/operations-policies-of-the-inter-american-development-bank,6127.html.  
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
Information Age Technologies and 
Development 
Productive sectors 
Economic infrastructure sectors 
Social infrastructure sectors 
Integrated development programs 
Policies for special areas: 
Women in Development 
Indigenous Peoples 
Asian Development 
Bank
99
 
Country classification and country 
focus 
Regional and subregional 
cooperation 
Sector and thematic policies: 
Poverty Reduction 
Gender and Development 
Incorporation of Social Dimensions 
into ADB Operations 
Governance 
Anticorruption 
Enhancing ADB's role in Combating 
Money Laundering and the Financing 
of Terrorism 
Adopted (and amendments approved) 
by ADB‟s Board of Executive 
Directors – no formal participation-
related or consultation requirements. 
Operations Evaluation Department 
Accountability Mechanism 
                                                 
99
 http://www.adb.org/About/policies-strategies.asp.  
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
Business products and instruments 
Partnerships 
Safeguard policies 
Analyses 
Financial 
Project administration: 
Project Performance Management 
System 
Consultants 
Procurement 
Loan Covenants 
Effectiveness of the Loan Agreement 
Disbursement 
Project Accounting, Financial 
Reporting, and Auditing 
Independent evaluation 
ADB Accountability Mechanism 
Internal Audit 
Public Communications 
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development
100
 
Public Information Policy 
Project Complaint Mechanism 
(Independent Recourse 
Mechanism) 
Environmental and Social Policy 
Environmental Procedures 
Sub-sectoral environmental 
guidelines 
Procurement Policies and Rules 
Internal Purchasing Policy and 
Procedures 
Anti-terrorist statement 
Common performance assessment 
report 
Moving transition forward 
Strategic Portfolio Review 
Addressing staff grievances  
Business plan and budget 
Capital resources review 
Adopted by Board of Executive 
Directors? 
Project Complaint Mechanism – 
Office of the Chief Compliance 
Officer
101
 
(previously: Independent Recourse 
Mechanism) 
                                                 
100
 http://www.ebrd.com/pages/about/policies.shtml.  
101
 Also issue Anti-corruption reports 
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
EBRD and ethnic minorities 
Political aspects of the EBRD 
mandate 
Fraud and corruption 
 
African Development 
Bank
102
 
Debt Management 
Guidelines and Procedures (e.g.): 
Information Note on the Checklist for 
Mainstreaming Gender and Climate 
Change in Projects 
Checklist for Gender Mainstreaming 
in the Water and Sanitation Sector 
Policy Guidelines and Procedures for 
Emergency Relief Assistance 
2009 Environmental Review 
Procedures for Private Sector 
Operations of the African 
Development Bank 
Environmental and Social Assessment 
Procedures for AfDB Public Sector 
Operations - June 2001  
Environmental and Social Assessment 
Procedures 
Adopted by Board of Executive 
Directors? 
Quality Assurance & Results Dept 
(OPQR) 
Operations Evaluation 
Independent Review Mechanism 
Auditor General‟s Office 
 
                                                 
102
 http://www.afdb.org/en/documents/policy-documents/.  
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Institution Main policy areas covered by 
OP&P 
Adoption and amendment 
procedures  
Enforcement mechanisms 
Handbook on Stakeholder 
Consultation and Participation in 
AfDB Operations 
Policy on Cross-Cutting Issues 
Sectoral Policy 
Special Initiatives 
Procurement 
Integrity and Anti-Corruption 
Information Disclosure 
 
 
